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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Censorship of Obscene Books
The difficulty of forming and applying
an effective statute designed to limit the
distribution of obscenity was recently il-
lustrated by the United States Supreme
Court decision in Smith v. California.' De-
fendant was convicted of violating a Los
Angeles City ordinance which, dispensing
with the element of knowledge, imposed
strict criminal liability for possession of an
obscene book in any place where books
are sold.2 On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court, while not indicating what
mental element is required to constitution-
ally prosecute, held that the statute had
such a tendency to inhibit constitutionally
protected expression that it could not
stand. Recognizing that the states have a
limited power to create strict criminal
liability, the Court reasoned that whenever
dispensing with the element of knowledge
may tend to work substantial restrictions
on freedom of expression the statute is un-
constitutional. The rationale is based on
the supposition that if the seller is liable
without knowledge he will tend to restrict
the books he sells to those he has inspected,
and therefore the distribution of all books,
obscene and not obscene, would be limited.
The freedom of expression 3 which is
1361 U.S. 147 (1959).
2 The ordinance is set out in full in the decision.
Id. at 148 n. 1.
3Freedom of the press and freedom of speech
generally are the same, being distinguished only
by the form of expression, and the term freedom
of expression will be used where pertinent to in-
clude both.
protected from abridgement by Congress
has long been recognized as also protected
from impairment by the states by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth. Amend-
ment.4 The principal reason for this pro-
tection is to guarantee the free interchange
of ideas for desirable political and social
changes' by preventing the prior restraints
on publications which had been practiced
by other governments., However, this pro-
tection extends not only to-exposition of
ideas but also to purely entertaining pub-
lications of no possible value to society. 7
Also, the protection is not limited to prior
restraints but also protects from punish-
ment subsequent to expression,8 although
the former is the more jealously guarded.9
4 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Strom-
berg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
5See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4
(1949); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95
(1940); Stromberg v. California, supra note 4, at
368-69.
6 See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462
(1907); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Re-
straint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 650-52
(1955).
7 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
Nor is the protection limited because the publica-
tion is a commercial one. Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
8 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492
(1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572, n. 3 (1942); Emerson, supra note 6, at
652; 2 EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 872-76 (2d ed.
1958).
9 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714-15
(1931).
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Freedom of expression, although a basic
constitutional guarantee, is not an absolute
right and in exceptional cases limitations
are recognized on the expression of those
who would abuse the freedom. The state
under the police power has the right to
limit freedom of constitutionally protected
expression not only by subsequent punish-
ment10 but also by prior restraint" where
there is a clear and present danger that
the expression will produce a serious sub-
stantive evil which the state has a right
to prevent. 12 When the expression is not
within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech, it has been held that proof
of a clear and present danger is not neces-
sary to the limitation.l3
Much debate has centered on attempted
limitations on the publication and distribu-
tion of obscenity. Apart from the difficulty
of application, few would argue with the
principle behind statutes punishing the dis-
tribution of obscenity.14 However, it has
been maintained that any prior restraint
on the publication or distribution of ob-
scenity would be unconstitutional. 15 Others,
'
0 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
11 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942) (dictum); Near v. Minnesota,
supra note 9, at 716 (1931) (dictum).
12 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919); see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
372-80 (1927) (concurring opinion).
13 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S' 250 (1952).
14 See Comment, 52 MICH. L. REV. 575, 577 n.
14 (1954) for a listing of state obscenity statutes
imposing criminal sanctions.
15 See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black in
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959);
see also dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas joined by Mr. Justice Black in Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445-47
(1957).
admitting that some prior restraint may be
constitutional, object to prior restraint of
obscenity because the vagueness of the
standard gives those applying it too much
discretion:' 0 Until recently the Supreme
Court had never directly passed on whether
obscenity was within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech, and whether it
could be enjoined prior to distribution.'"
However, Supreme Court dicta indicated
that prior restraint of obscenity might be
permissible.' 8
Probably one of the reasons for the ab-
sence of decisions finally determining these
issues was the inability of the states to
form a definition of obscenity in their
statutes which would satisfy the precision
of definition required by the Supreme
Court to comply with the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19
16 Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 670 (1955).
17 See text accompanying notes 22 and 23 infra.
18 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942). "There are certain well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene .. " Id. at 571-72. In Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the Court,
recognizing in dictum the constitutionality of war-
time censorship based on the clear and present
danger test, added that "on similar grounds, the
primary requirements of decency may be enforced
against obscene publications." Id. at 716. See also
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952),
holding that libel is not within the area of consti-
tutionally protected speech and therefore the clear
and present danger test need not be met for prior
restraint. In dictum the Court added: "Certainly
no one would contend that obscene speech, for ex-
ample, may be punished only upon a showing of
such circumstances [i.e., clear and present dan-
ger]." Id. at 266.
19 There have been many obscenity tests, the most
widely used early test was "whether the tendency
of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, and into whose hands a pub-
There was no real indication of what would
satisfy constitutional requirements until
the decision in Roth v. United States, 20
where the Supreme Court defined the test
of obscenity to be "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to pru-
lication of this sort may fall." The Queen v. Hick-
lin, [1868] 3-Q.B. 360, 371. This test was gener-
ally superseded by the test laid down in United
States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705,
708 (2d Cir. 1934), which judged a book by its
dominant effect and literary and social value, and
not by the tendency of the passages to deprave
the minds of those open to such influences into
whose hands the book might fall. See United
States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y.
1913). For other definitions see People v. Van-
guard Press, Inc., 192 Misc. 127, 129-30, 84
N.Y.S.2d 427, 430 (Mag. Ct. 1947); Common-
wealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d
840, 844 (1945); People v. Wepplo, 78 Cal. App.
2d 959, 178 P.2d 853, 855 (1947); Common-
wealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Sup. 120, 70
A.2d 389, 390 (1950) (per curiam). Despite the
many definitions and tests for obscenity, the states
did not meet the precision of definition in their
statutes which the Supreme Court required. In
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), a
statute which imposed criminal liability for dis-
tributing magazines containing stories of crime,
bloodshed, and lust, massed to incite crime was
held unconstitutional. The case of Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), holding
that barring a movie because it was sacrilegious
was too vague a standard to comply with proce-
dural due process, was used along with the Winters
case as a precedent for reversing decisions based
on state obscenity statutes. In Gelling v. Texas,
343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam), the Court re-
versed the application of a statute forbidding ex-
hibition of a movie prejudicial to the best interests
of the people, giving no reasons and citing the
Burstyn and Winters cases. In Commercial Pic-
tures Corp. v. Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d
502 (1953), rev'd per curiam sub noma. Superior
Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587
(1954), refusal to license a movie because im-
moral or tending to corrupt morals was reversed
with no reasons, citing the Burstyn case. In Holm-
by Products, Inc. v. Vaughn, 177 Kan. 728, 282
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rient interest. '21 In the same case the Court
held that obscenity was not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech
and rejected the application of the clear
and present danger test as a necessary re-
quirement for limiting the publication and
distribution of obscenity. 22 On the same
day the Court decided Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown,23 holding that Section 22-a of the
New York Code of Criminal Procedure,
authorizing a city to enjoin the distribu-
tion of obscenity and giving the distributor
a right to trial of the issue of obscenity
within a day and a decision within two
days after trial, was not unconstitutional
as a prior restraint interfering with free-
dom of expression.
States now had a definition of obscenity
with which to mold their statutes and they
also had the power to enjoin prior to dis-
tribution. The decisions were an indication
of a more sympathetic attitude towards
attempts to protect the public from ob-
scenity.
Smith v. California24 represents a new
approach to striking down state obscenity
statutes. As noted, prior objections had
been based primarily on the vagueness of
the obscenity definitions and a series of
cases was necessary before a satisfactory
definition was declared. The Court held
P.2d 412, rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 870 (1955),
Kansas upheld the censorship of a picture under
a statute forbidding pictures cruel, obscene, inde-
cent, or immoral, or such as tend to debase or
corrupt morals. The Supreme Court reversed, cit-
ing the Superior Films and Burstyn cases. It would
seem that the basis for reversing these cases was
the vagueness of the test applied. See Note, 31
ST. JoHN's L. REV. 93, 96-98 (1956).
20 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21 Id. at 489.
22 Id. at 486-87.
23 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
24 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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that a statute which completely eliminates
the requirement of knowledge could not
stand but gave no definite indication of
what degree of knowledge would satisfy
constitutional standards. 25 The situation
caused by the lack of a satisfactory consti-
tutional norm for the definition of obscenity
is repeated, since now the states have no
criteria by which to judge the degree of
knowledge required.
The Court in the Smith case recognized
that the state can create strict criminal
liability in other areas, specifically men-
tioning pure food and drug acts which the
Court recognized as justified by the great
danger posed by contaminated food. 26 The
pure food and drug acts are only one ex-
ample of many statutes creating strict lia-
bility. 27 The emphasis in these statutes is
25 "We need not and most definitely do not pass
today on what sort of mental element is requisite
to a constitutionally permissable prosecution of a
bookseller for carrying an obscene book in stock;
whether honest mistake as to whether its contents
in fact constituted obscenity need be an excuse;
whether there might be circumstances under
which the State constitutionally might require that
a bookseller investigate further, or might put on
him the burden of explaining why he did not, and
what such circumstances might be." Smith v. Cali-
fornia, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959).
26 Smith v. California, supra note 25, at 152.
27 One author has classified offenses not requiring
knowledge into illegal sales of liquor, adulterated
foods, misbranded articles, violations of traffic
regulations, motor vehicle laws, and general police
regulations for the safety, health and well being
of the community. See Sayre, Public Welfare Of-
fenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 72-73, 84-88
(1933). Specific examples of offenses where
knowledge is not required are: Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (good faith belief
in capacity to marry is no defense to bigamy);
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57
(1910) (cutting timber on state land); City of
Birmingham v. Reed, 35 Ala. App. 31, 44 So.2d
607 (1949) (possession of lottery tickets); State
v. Dunn, 202 Iowa 1188, 211 N.W. 850 (1927)
(possession of auto with changed serial number).
the achievement of some social betterment
through regulatory measures in the exercise
of police power rather than punishment of
crimes, 28 and the protection of the public
against the principal consequences of acts
capable of injuring society.29 These evil
consequences to society are in no degree
increased by the offender's knowledge or
decreased by his ignorance, 30 and where the
requirement of -proof of guilty knowledge
would render enforcement difficult, if not
impossible, the legislative intent to dispense
with the element of knowledge has justifi-
able basis. 31 The mere fact that a state
police statute punishes an offense actually
committed without regard to the offender's
knowledge does not per se render the stat-
ute unconstitutional under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.32
The Court in Smith v. CaliforniaM3 did not
object to the imposition of strict liability
per se but struck down the statute because
as a collateral effect it would tend to restrict
the dissemination of books not obscene.
The Court recognized that even a statute
requiring some mental element will have a
tendency to inhibit dissemination of ma-
terial not obscene but it gave no defini-
tion of the degree of knowledge required,
or what relation the degree of knowledge
should bear to the tendency to restrict dis-
tribution of material not obscene. It would
seem that, as a necessary corollary to the
Court's reasoning, the more knowledge re-
quired, the less tendency the statute should
28 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
29 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
(1943); State v. Newton, 50 N.J.L. 534, 14 Atl.
604 (1888).
30 Groff v. State, 171 Ind. 547, 85 N.E. 769 (1908).
31 State v. Rogers, 95 Me. 94, 49 Atl. 564 (1901).
32 Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S.
57 (1910); See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S.
250, 251-52 (1922).
33 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
have to limit distribution since a greater
degree of knowledge calls for an increase
in proof necessary for conviction. This in
turn results in a difficulty of enforcement
which ultimately results in a lower degree
of care on the seller's part as to the nature
of the materials offered for sale. Although
not explicitly stated in the decision, it would
seem that the degree of knowledge consti-
tutionally required will lie somewhere be-
tween the two extremes, namely, strict
criminal liability without knowledge, which
makes enforcement easier, and no criminal
liability without knowledge, which makes
enforcement just about impossible. The
determination of the degree of knowledge
required should be based on a balancing
of the state's right to protect the public
from the dangers of obscenity by enforce-
ment of its penal statutes, and the limita-
tion on the freedom of expression which
the Court assumes will tend to increase as
the required degree of knowledge is de-
creased. Although the difficulty of enforce-
ment resulting from a high degree of
requisite knowledge is a reality, the alter-
native, that limitation on protected expres-
sion will increase by a decrease in requisite
knowledge, is not certain. The Court con-
siders food and drug strict liability justified
by the great danger to society from con-
taminated foods. It is submitted that al-
though the danger to society from obscenity
is of a different kind, it is no less real. 34 The
danger of obscenity subtly destroying the
moral values of society may seem remote
in comparison to the immediate effects of
34 See 1955 LEG. Doc. No. 37, REPORT OF THE
NEW YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE
TO STUDY THE PUBLICATION OF COMICS, showing
an established causal connection between what a
young thrill-killer read and what he did. Kempel
& Wall, Extralegal Censorship of Literature, 33
N.Y.U.L. REV. 989 n. 4 (1958).
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a mass attack of ptomaine poisoning. How-
ever, the danger is still there and the argu-
ment that pure bodies are more important
than pure minds, although apparently valid
in the immediate from the point of view of
the state, may ultimately prove erroneous.3 5
California argued that without strict lia-
bility, enforcement would be ineffective
since sellers would disclaim knowledge of
the contents of their books. The Court
answered that eyewitness testimony of a
seller reading the book would not be neces-
sary to prove awareness of its contents,
since the circumstances may warrant an
inference that he was aware of the contents
despite his denial. 36 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in a concurring opinion states:
Obviously the Court is not holding that a
bookseller must familiarize himself with
the contents of every book in his shop. No
less obviously, the Court does not hold that
a bookseller who insulates himself against
knowledge about an offending book is there-
by free to maintain an emporium for smut.37
Mr. Justice Frankfurter continues: "A book-
seller may, of course, be well aware of the
nature of a book and its appeal without
having opened its cover, or, in any true
sense, having knowledge of the book. ' 38
In a recent New York case 3l' defendant
booksellers were charged with possessing
obscene books with intent to sell. Defen-
35 See 1954 LEG. Doc. No. 37, REPORT OF THE
NEW YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE
TO STUDY THE PUBLICATION OF COMICS, illustrat-
ing how the availability of pornographic and ob-
scene literature at low prices has caused grave
concern among parents, psychiatrists, police, and
educators.
36 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959).
37 Id. at 161.
38 Id. at 164.
39 People v. Schenkman, 20 Misc. 2d 1093, 195
N.Y.S. 2d 570 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1960).
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dants contended that there was no evidence
that they had read the books and therefore
under the Smith case the prosecution had
not established knowledge. The four books
involved were paper covered, of the type
that usually sells for twenty-five cents, were
relatively short in content length, and two
of them had suggestive statements as to the
contents on the back cover. Defendants
were offering them for sale at five dollars
each. Relying heavily on Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in the Smith
case, the court held that when paper cov-
ered books such as these are sold for five
dollars, the seller knows the sale is induced
by the obscenity of the contents. 40 Whether
this degree of knowledge will suffice to sat-
isfy constitutional standards remains to be
seen.
Section 542 of the New York Penal Law,
imposing criminal liability on one who
knowingly distributes obscene material to
persons under eighteen, defines "know-
ingly" as: "having knowledge of the char-
acter and content of the publication or
failure to exercise reasonable inspection
which would disclose the content and char-
acter of the same."'41 Personal or direct
knowledge of the content of the matter
distributed is not required and the section
imposes a duty upon the vendor to make a
reasonable inspection before the sale to
one under eighteen.42 The Court in the
Smith case stated that it did not decide
"whether there might be circumstances
under which the State constitutionally might
require that a bookseller investigate further,
or might put on him the burden of explain-
ing why he did not, and what such circum-
40 Id. at 1098-99, 195 N.Y.S.2d at 575-76.
41 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 542 (Supp. 1959).
42 People v. Finkelstein, 156 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Magis.
Ct. 1955).
stances might be."'43 The Court seems to
admit that there might be such circum-
-stances, and surely in a statute such as this
the state's right to protect youth from the
dangers of obscenity outbalances the specu-
lative tendency of such a statute to limit the
dissemination of books not obscene. As
Justice Frankfurter said: "the constitutional
protection of non-obscene speech cannot
absorb the constitutional power of the
States to deal with obscenity.
' 44
Section 1141 of the New York Penal
Law imposes criminal liability for possess-
ing obscene matter. The statute does not
make knowledge a necessary element, but
by construction requires proof that the
seller knew the matter was obscene. 45 In
People v. Shapiro,46 where the defendant
had considerable experience as a magazine
distributor, was aware of section 1141, and
had to unwrap and re-wrap magazines be-
fore distributing them, he could not avoid
liability by claiming lack of knowledge
since a casual inspection of the magazine
covers put him on notice of the probable
contents. Again, it is not clear if under the
Smith case this degree of knowledge would
satisfy constitutional requirements.
Declaring a strict liability obscenity stat-
ute unconstitutional because of its sup-
posed tendency to limit the dissemination
of all books does not seem well founded
when the argument is balanced with the
state's constitutional right to protect its
citizens from obscenity. Even if such a
statute did tend to limit distribution some-
what, it would seem justified by the danger
obscenity poses.
43 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959).
44 Id. at 162-63.
45 People v. Brooklyn News Co., 12 Misc. 2d 768,
174 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Kings County Ct. 1958).
46 6 App. Div. 2d 271, 177 N.Y.S.2d 670 (2d
Dep't 1958).
It is unlikely that the decision will be
changed. However, the Court should define
the degree of knowledge constitutionally
required to prosecute a bookseller, and
not leave the issue to a trial-and-error de-
termination. The definition should entail a
minor degree of requisite knowledge,
thereby making effective enforcement
possible.
Conditional Release of the
Criminally Insane
In the District of Columbia, a person
tried for a criminal offense and found not
guilty by reason of insanity is required by
statute' to be committed to a mental hos-
pital. 2 Release from the institution is
dependent upon approval of the superin-
tendent and the court.3 In a recent case,
Hough v. United States,4 the conditional
I D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301(d) (Supp. VII, 1959).
2 The District of Columbia is not the only juris-
diction to have such a statute. Mandatory commit-
ment is also a feature of the laws of the following:
Colorado - COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §39-8-4
(1954); Georgia - GA. CODE ANN. §27-1503
(1953); Kansas-KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §62-
1532 (1950); Minnesota -MINN. STAT. ANN.
§631.19 (Supp. 1959); Nebraska-NEB. REV.
STAT. §29-2203 (1948); Nevada - NEV. REV.
STAT. §175.445 (1956); Ohio- OHio REV. CODE
ANN. §2945.39 (Baldwin 1953); Wisconsin-Wis.
STAT. ANN. §957.11 (West 1957).
3 The superintendent first certifies that the patient
has recovered his sanity, that he will not, in the
opinion of the superintendent, be dangerous to
himself or to others in the reasonable future and
that he is entitled to his release. Upon objection
by the prosecutor's office the court must, or, upon
its own initiative, it may hold a hearing to de-
termine the issue. D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301(e)
(Sup. VII, 1959). In the Hough case, the hear-
ing followed objection by the United States
Attorney.
For a synopsis of the commitment and release
provisions in other jurisdictions, see Note, 68
YALE L.J. 306-07 (app.) (1958).
4 271 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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release provisions 5 of the statute were
tested. The Circuit Court, on an appeal
following denial of the release by the Dis-
trict Court, held that recovery of sanity
need not be proved in the case of a condi-
tional release, but that it only need be
established that, under the conditions im-
posed, such person will not be dangerous
to himself or others. It also held that the
hospital authorities, in permitting appel-
lant to leave the hospital for several hours
per day as part of the rehabilitation pro-
gram, had acted improperly in that this
constituted a conditional release without
court approval.
The decision emphasizes the problem of
the disposition of those found not guilty
of crime by reason of insanity. Such per-
sons are distinguished on the one hand
from those who have been convicted of
crime and who are subject to punishment,
and, on the other hand, from the insane
who have never been indicted for a crime.0
A determination by a jury that a de-
fendant is not guilty by reason of insanity
is not a determination of his present mental
condition, but only of the mental condition
at the time of the alleged crime. 7 A provi-
sion making commitment of such person
mandatory without any additional hearing
thus has the effect of compelling confine-
ment of one who has been found not de-
serving of punishment and who has not
been found presently in need of treatment.
Assuming that he is in need of treatment,
under the ruling of the instant case the
treatment itself, insofar as it involves any
degree of freedom from confinement, is
dependent upon the approval of the court.
5 D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301 (e) (Supp. VII, 1959).
6 Compare D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301 (Supp. VII,
1959), with D.C. CODE ANN. §21-311 (1951).
7 Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1, 20 Am. Rep.
633, 634 (1876).
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Thus, from the moment of the verdict, his
future liberty rests primarily with the court
and only secondarily with medical authori-
ties.8
The Court in the Hough case rejected
any suggestion that the confinement was in
the nature of punishment.9 Nevertheless,
there is no denial of the fact that a finding
of not guilty by reason of insanity is re-
garded as giving authorities a power over
the defendant which they would not have
if, for example, an unqualified verdict of
not guilty had been rendered and the de-
fendant had been later thought insane:
The test of this statute is not whether a
particular individual, engaged in the ordi-
nary pursuits of life, is committable to a
mental institution under the law governing
civil commitments .... This statute applies
to an exceptional class of people.... People
in that category are treated by Congress in
a different fashion from persons who have
somewhat similar mental conditions, but
who have not committed offenses or ob-
tained verdicts of not guilty by reason of
insanity .... 10
The punishment of the mentally ill would
appear to be without justification either
morally11 or legally.1 2 As retribution it is
s In effect, the function of the hospital super-
intendent is simply'to initiate the release proceed-
ings. See D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301(e) (Supp.
VII, 1959). In the absence of certification by the
superintendent of the patient's recovery, the
patient may initiate proceedings himself by filing
for a writ of habeas corpus. D. C. CODE ANN.
§24-301(g) (Supp. VII; 1959).
9 Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458, 462
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
10 Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667, 669-70
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
11 "Punishments are directed not to irrational
and irresponsible beings . . . but to men who
voluntarily do harm to others." ROONEY, LAW-
LESSNESS, LAW, AND SANCTION 66 (1937).
12 In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789, 791
(1904).
indefensible because the mentally ill by
definition are not criminally responsible for
their behavior.18 Nor can any deterrent ef-
fect be offered in support of punishment,
for legal insanity comprehends only those
whose abnormality makes any deterrence
impossible. 14
Statutes compelling prompt commitment
without further judicial injury were once
held unconstitutional as violations of due
process. 15 More recent cases, relying on a
continuing presumption of insanity and the
availability of habeas corpus proceedings
to challenge illegal detention, have held
that such a statute does not deprive the
defendant of due process. 16 In effect, the
jury's finding that the defendant was in-
sane at the time of the alleged crime be-
comes a substitute for the civil hearing on
the issue of sanity. A presumption of con-
tinuance of the insanity from the time of
the crime then arises, 17 just as it does from
the time of the finding of insanity in the
case of a civil proceeding.' 8 In both cases,
the issue of the continuance of insanity
may be tried in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing.19
A fallacy can be found in the treat-
ment of the jury's finding of insanity as if
13 Note, 68 YALE L.J. 293, 300-01 (1958).
14 Id. at 301.
15 Brown v. Urquhart, 139 Fed. 846 (C.C.W.D.
Wash. 1905) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds,
205 U.S. 179 (1907); Underwood v. People, 32
Mich. 1, 20 Am. Rep. 633 (1876); In re Boyett.
136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904).
16 Ex parte Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 Pac. 769
(1930); Ex parte Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 Pac.
492 (1912); People v. Dubina, 304 Mich. 363,
8 N.W.2d 99 (1943); State v. Saffron, 146 Wash.
202, 262 Pac. 970 (1927).
17 Ex parte Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 Pac. 492,
495 (1930).
18 National Life Ins. Co. v. Jayne, 132 F.2d 358
(10th Cir. 1942).
19 See Overholser v. Boddie, 184 F.2d 240 (D.C.
Cir. 1950).
it were based on a test of civil committa-
bility, 20 when in fact there is no finding
that the defendant, even at the time of the
alleged crime, was committable. 21 The test
of criminal responsibility simply is not
conterminous with the civil test of com-
mitability. 22 It is error to presume that it
is, and to superimpose the presumption
that the insanity continues to the time of
commitment is to compound the error.
It has been said that the statute is an
indispensable crutch 23 for the Durham24
20 Such a test has been advocated by the Group
for the Advancement of Psychiatry. Reid, Under-
standing the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal
Insanity, 69 YALE L.J. 367, 397-98 (1960).
21 The quantum of evidence which supports a
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is com-
monly much less than would be required for
a commitment. In the District of Columbia, once
the issue of insanity is raised the burden is on
the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reason-
able doubt, or to prove that the act was not a
product of the insanity. Therefore, there is never
an affirmative finding of insanity; the verdict
merely reflects the failure of the prosecution to
sustain its burden. See Carter v. United States,
252 F.2d 608, 614-15 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Likewise,
it would appear that, in some jurisdictions at
least, a finding that a person is committable is
not conclusive on the question of criminal re-
sponsibility. Thus, in People v. Willard, 150 Cal.
543, 89 Pac. 124 (1907), the defendant had been
taken before the Superior Court for a commit-
ment hearing. Following testimony that he was in-
sane, homicidal, and dangerous, he was adjudged
insane. As the judge began to sign the order of
commitment, defendant drew a pistol and shot
and killed the complaining witness. The court
sustained a conviction for first degree murder.
22 "The immediate issue . . . is fundamentally an
ethical one and the test is of responsibility, not
of medical insanity." Proposed Revisions of the
M'Naghten Rule, 4 CATHOLIC LAWYER 297, 309
(Autumn 1958).
23 McGee, Defense Problems Under the Durham
Rule, 5 CATHOLIC LAWYER 35, 42 n.40 (Winter
1959). This, of course, would not explain the
presence of such statutes in jurisdictions other
than the District of Columbia. See note 2 supra.
24 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
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rule; that it has in view the closing of the
avenue of escape from punishment opened
by the vague and uncertain test of Durham
to those who, in reality, are not insane.
25
The statute, in this view, was designed to
ensure that anyone who took that avenue
of escape would find that it led to an in-
definite term in a mental hospital. 26 This is
clearly invalid as a motive. Any defects in
the test of insanity should be remedied by
an alteration of the test, rather than by in-
definite confinement of those found not
guilty under it. As a substitute punishment
for those who succeed in evading the law
by feigned pleas of insanity, the statute
would appear clearly to be open to the
further constitutional objection that the
punishment is "cruel and unusual."
27
The protection of the public and of the
individual is less clearly invalid as a motive
for the statute. Indeed, the police power
and the role of the state as parens patriae
are the basic justifications for civil com-
mitments. 28 But both motives, of necessity,
presuppose a finding that the person is
presently a danger. It is very questionable
that public safety requires or supports the
confinement of a person simply because of
a failure to establish that he is not a danger.
The logical implications of such thinking
present a far greater threat to the public
than does a person found not guilty by
reason of insanity. 29
A defendant, having been acquitted, is
25 McGee, supra note 23, at 42.
26 McGee, supra note 23, at 35.
27 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
28 Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill; Prob-
lems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV. 945,
955-60 (1959).
29 "The terms 'star chamber' and lettre de cachet
describe no imaginary evils dreamed up by cau-
tious lawyers, but very real practices current
not so many hundreds of years ago, and hardly
exceeded in arbitrariness, tyranny and injustice
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entitled to all the privileges of an innocent
man. The fact that his innocence derived
from his mental incapacity to form the
requisite criminal intent makes him no less
innocent and no less entitled to all of the
protection of the law than if acquitted on
any other ground. 30 The protection of the
individual demands some determination of
the necessity for confinement prior to the
confinement. These protections could be
provided without increasing the danger to
the public by employing the emergency
commitment procedures available in almost
every state.3' The procedure of such a
commitment is summary and permits de-
tention for only a short period. 32 If neces-
sary, before the end of that period there
could be a formal commitment, which in-
volves a judicial hearing in which the pro-
spective patient is given an opportunity to
contest the need for hospitalization and
which is followed, upon adjudication of
insanity, by commitment for an indeter-
minate period.3 3 Thus, the rights of both
the public and the individual are protected
throughout the course of the proceedings.
Since the confinement is for the purpose
of treatment rather than punishment, the
question of its duration is a medical prob-
lem and should be treated as such. The
authority to release should therefore be
by practices rampant in Germany and elsewhere
in our own times.
"Safeguards designed to guarantee fair pro-
cedure and to prevent the abuse of commitment
laws ... are therefore not mere technicalities and
formalities to be lightly brushed aside ....
Weihofen and Overholser, Commitment of the
Mentally ill, 24 TEX. L. REv. 307, 337 (1946).
30 See In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789,
791 (1904).
31 Ross, supra note 28, at 953.
32 Ibid.
33 See Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV.
945, 954 (1959).
left either to the hospital authorities3 4 or
to an administrative board which is better
equipped to pass on the success of the
treatment than are the courts.35
Rights of Prisoners
The problem of the rights of those incar-
cerated in penal institutions has again been
brought into sharp focus. In Bailleaux v.
Holmes,' petitioners, prisoners in the Ore-
gon State Penitentiary, charged that defend-
ant prison officials interfered with their
study of law and acquisition of legal mate-
rials, and thereby limited the exercise of
their constitutional right to free and speedy
access to the courts. 2 The United States
District Court held, inter alia, that prison
officials may not unreasonably impose re-
straints on prisoners' study of law in the
interest of administrative efficiency.
"A citizen is still a citizen, though guilty
34 Two states which formerly required court ap-
proval have recently substituted hospital release.
Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. §59-242 (Supp. 1959),
with Ark. Acts 1947, No. 241, 16. Compare
TEX. CODE CUIM. PROC. ANN. art. 932 b, §2
(Supp. 1959), with Tex. Laws 1937, ch. 466, §3.
35 It has been suggested that this method is prefer-
able to hospital release, in that hospital authori-
ties are more likely to be influenced by crowded
hospital conditions and by public opinion. See
Note, 68 YALE L.J. 293, 303-06 (1958).
1 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The action was-brought
under the Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. §1343
(1958), which provides: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of
any State law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any right, privi-
lege or immunity secured by the Constitu-
tion of the United States or by any act of
Congress providing for equal rights of citi-
zens or of all persons within the jurisdic-
diction of the United States ......
of crime and visited with punishment"3 -
so states the United States Supreme Court.
There exists, however, the basic problem
of determining just what rights this citizen
possesses, or what rights this citizen has
relinquished as a result of his conviction.
It is not presumed that a man convicted
of a crime and sentenced to prison gives up
all rights except those specifically left with
him. 4 On the contrary, it is assumed that he
keeps all rights except those taken away
expressly or by necessary implication. This
rule was established in the leading case of
Coffin v. Reichard.5 The rule was therein
stated:
A prisoner retains all the rights of an
ordinary citizen except those expressly, or
by necessary implication, taken from 'him
by law. While the law does take his liberty
and imposes a duty of servitude and observ-
ance of discipline for his regulation and
that of other prisoners, it does not deny his
right to personal security against unlawful
invasion.
When a man possesses a substantial right,
the courts will be diligent in finding a way to
protect it. The fact that a person is legally
in prison does not prevent the use of habeas
corpus to protect his other inherent rights. 6
The expression "substantial right" is of
significance because the courts will only
concern themselves with cases involving
a breach of constitutional rights.7 On the
3 See White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646,
651 (1871).
4 This view, although it predominates today, was
not always accepted. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Common-
wealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871) (Convicted
prisoner considered a "slave" and only entitled to
those rights specifically given to him - the exact
opposite of the prevailing view today.).
5 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 887 (1945).
6 Id. at 445.
7 See 28 U.S.C. §1343 (3) (1958); 17 Stat. 13
(1871), 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1958); Dowd v. United
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other hand, courts have been reluctant to
supervise the administration of prison dis-
cipline,8 although at times the two seem
inseparable. The mere censoring of mail
constitutes no violation, 9 nor does a ward-
en's refusal to mail a prisoner's love let-
ters'0 or his clothing."
The right involved in the principal case
was the right of prisoners to have access
to the courts. The Constitution guarantees
every man his day in court and an oppor-
tunity to be heard.' 2 The petitioners alleged
that their study of law was an integral part
of their right of access, and that therefore,
prison officials could not unlawfully inter-
fere with that study. Specifically, petitioners
complained of several restraints: (1) pris-
oners could not study or prepare legal
documents in their cells; (2) prisoners
were restricted in their ability to purchase
law books or statutes; (3) special censor-
ship was imposed on legal documents and
communications with courts and attorneys;
(4) legal documents found in prisoners'
possession outside the prison library were
confiscated; (5) prisoners in isolation were
denied access to the courts, counsel and
States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Ex parte
Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
8 See Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 419
(D.C. Cir. 1953); Shepherd v. Hunter, 163 F.2d
872 (10th Cir. 1947); Sarshik v. Sanford, 142
F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1944) (per curiam).
9 See United States ex rel. Vranick v. Randolph,
161 F. Supp. 553, 559 (E.D. Ill. 1958); Green v.
Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253, 256 (S.D. Me. 1953).
10 Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1949).
11 Platek v. Aderhold, 73 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.
1934).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial .. " Ibid. City of Buffalo
v. Hawks, 226 App. Div. 480, 236 N.Y. Supp. 89
(4th Dep't 1929). See also Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312 (1921).
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their legal papers.13 In its opinion the Court
assumed that the prisoners' study of law was
an essential part of the right of access. 4
The defendants based their objections pri-
marily on the ground that to allow peti-
tioners' contentions would result in storage
difficulties, censorship problems, as well as
a general deterioration of prison discipline.
In light of the sacrosanct status of consti-
tutional rights, this argument has little
merit. In noting the inconvenience caused
by a flood of habeas corpus petitions a well
known jurist once commented: "We must
not play fast and loose with basic consti-
tutional rights in the interest of adminis-
trative efficiency."' 5
Even if it can be established, however,
that there has been a deprivation of a sub-
stantial right, the legality of that depriva-
tion cannot be impeached unless it is found
that the basic requirements of due process
of law have not been met. Admittedly, the
constitutional caveat is expressed nega-
tively: "no State . . . shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . "16 but the
necessary implication of this language is
that one can be so deprived, provided there
is due process of law. Naturally, the diffi-
culty arises in defining and locating the
requisite due process. Traditionally, the
basic due process test has been that a law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
13 See Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361, 362
(D. Ore. 1959).
14 Id. at 363. In light of the fact that this "right"
is at least twice removed from the constitutional
guarantee, it would seem that a strong argument
might be made to the contrary. This would be
particularly true where adequate "post-convic-
tion" statutes have been enacted.
15 See United States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 247
F.2d 662, 669 (2d Cir. 1957), (Medina, J.) cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 915 (1958).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation
to the object sought to be attained. 7
In the area of deprivation of prisoners'
rights, there are several theories by which
one may seek to bottom the legal justifica-
tion for an infringement. It has been sug-
gested that the very fact of imprisonment,
or the prison sentence itself, provides the
necessary basis of due process.' 8 It would
seem, however, that the prison sentence,
which undoubtedly serves to lawfully de-
prive the individual of his freedom to move
about at will, or his power to communicate
freely with those outside prison walls,
would not justify a deprivation in no real
way logically connected to the reason for
imprisonment. Therefore a restraint on a
prisoner's right to communicate with his
attorney, or a restraint on a prisoner's right
to worship, could not be founded in the law
which originally authorized the individual's
imprisonment, because the means em-
ployed would bear no "real and substantial
relation" to the end sought to be attained.
Certainly the restraints imposed upon a
criminal are not imposed solely for the
sake of punishing him. Were this the case,
it would be easier to justify unwonted
restraints upon his personal rights. Such
theory, in addition to being legally indefen-
sible, 19 is suspect on moral grounds. 20
It may be argued, however, that the au-
17 See Defiance Milk Prods. Co. v. Du Mond,
309 N.Y. 537, 132 N.E.2d 829 (1956); Noyes v.
Erie & Wyoming Farmers Co-op. Corp. 281 N.Y.
187, 22 N.E. 2d 334 (1939).
18 See discussion of McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J.
Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (1957) in 4 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 89 (Winter 1958).
19 See HALL & GLUECK, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 9-10 (1951).
20 See AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, H-11, q. 68,
art. 1; II-I, q. 43, art. 7, ad. 2. See also ROONEY,
LAWLESSNESS, LAW, AND SANCTION 39-44 (1937).
thority for the deprivation of prisoners'
rights can be found in the form of statutes
conferring authority on prison officials to
control and discipline inmates. 21 Conced-
edly, prison officials can make regulations
which may result in the deprivation of a
prisoner's rights, but which are nevertheless
valid because they bear a reasonable rela-
tion to the maintenance of prison security.
Again, however, the real and substantial
relation is the sine qua non. So, for example,
it would be difficult to conceive of the rela-
tion between a regulation restraining a pris-
oner's right to worship and the maintenance
of a successful security system. Likewise,
in the instant case, the prisoner's study of
law cannot be stifled on the ground that
such study interferes with prison -discipline,
because, as the Court pointed out, "admin-
istrative control . . . must yield to the
basic right to have access to the courts. 22
The Court's meaning, although not ex-
pressed, is none the less clear; administra-
tive control must yield because adminis-
trative control can exist separate from and
unimpaired by the influence of this particu-
lar activity. Undoubtedly, if this fact could
not be shown, a regulation prohibiting the
study of law would be valid.
21 See, e.g., N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 112: "The com-
missioner of correction shall have the ... control
of the state prisons and the prisoners therein....
He shall make such rules and regulations . . . for
the government and discipline of each prisoner, as
he may deem proper .. " Ibid. See also 18 U.S.C.
§4042 (1958).
22 Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361, 365 (D.
Ore. 1959).
6 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1960
Full Disclosure by Attorneys
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support the constitution of the United
States, and the constitution of the State of
New York, and 'that I will faithfully dis-
chiirge the duties of the office of Attorney
at Law, according to the best of my abil-
ity."' Admission to the Bar of the State of
New York is thus effected. Utterance of
these words heaps upon the qualified candi-
date all the privileges, and all the corre-
sponding burdens, incident to membership
in an ancient and most honored profession.
With his admission to the bar, the attor-
ney is privileged to be instilled as an
"officer of the court, and, like the court
itself, an instrument of justice." 2 To this
privilege is attached the duty to assigt the
court in its deliberation, to stand in fiduciktry
relation to it,3 and to refrain always from
any practice that might disrupt, impede or
thwart the judicial process. 4
The New York Court of Appeals has re-
1 N. Y. CONST. art. XIII, §1.
2 People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.'Y. 465,
470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928) (Cardozo,
C. J.).
3People v. Beattie, 137 Ill.-553, 27 N.E. 1096
(1891). "The lawyer's duty is of a double char-
acter. He . . . owes the duty of good faith and
honorable dealing to the judicial tribunals before
whom he practices-his profession. He is an officer
of the court, - a minister in the temple of justice.
His high vocation is to correctly inform the court
upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid
it in doing justice and arriving at correct con-
clusions." Id. at 574, 27 N;E. 1103. See Canon
22, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS OF PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS: "The conduct of the lawyer
before the Court and with other.lawyers should
be characterized by candor and fairness." Ibid.
4 In New York, the Appellate Division is au-
thorized to "remove from office any attorney...
who is guilty of . . . any conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice." N. Y. JUDICIARY
LAW §90(2).
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cently indicated, in Matter of Cohen,5 that
this duty of cooperation, attaching to law-
yers as officers of the court, is not lightly to
be assumed, nor may it readily be avoided.
In Matter of Cohen, the defendant, an
attorney under non-criminal investigation
pertaining to the conduct of his law prac-
tice,6 asserted his right against self incrim-
ination7 and declined to answer most of the
sixty questions asked of him pursuant to the
inquiry. Replying to a warning by counsel
for the inquiry that such refusal to answer
might inspire an adverse recommendation
from the Appellate Division (an allusion to
disbarment proceedings), defense counsel
declared that no punishment ought accrue
to attorneys for "doing what they had an
absolute legal right to do."'8 This remark
isolates the precise issue resolved in Cohen,
viz., whether the disbarment of an attorney
who declined to testify in a non-criminal
proceeding is in fact a violation of his right
under the due process clauseY
The question is a narrow one and the
minority (only Judge Fuld dissented) and
majority opinions serve as ample sum-
mary of the key arguments in the area.
Chief Judge Desmond, in the majority
opinion, bases his decision solely upon the
duty of cooperation which befalls all at-
torneys by virtue of their special relation
5 7 N. Y. 2d 488, 166 N.E. 2d 672, 199 N.Y.S.
2d_658 .(1960).
6 Specifically, the investigation "was concerned
with charges of alleged illegal, corrupt and un-
ethical practices and of alleged conduct preju-
dicial to the administration of justice, by attorneys
and others acting with them, in the County of
Kings. ..." Matter of Cohen, 7 N. Y. 2d 488,
492, 166 N.E. 2d 672, 673, 199 N.Y.S. 2d. 658,
660 (1960).
7 U. S. CONST. amend. V; N. Y. CONST. art. 1, §6.
8 Matter of Cohen, 7 N. Y. 2d 488, 494, 166 N.E.
2d 672, 675, 199 N.Y.S. 2d 658, 662 (1960).
9 See note 7 supra.
to the court.'0 Adherence to this duty is
among the conditions by which membership
in the bar is conferred upon the attorney.
"Membership . . . is a privilege burdened
with conditions. . . .Compliance [there-
with] . . . is essential at the moment of
admission; but is equally essential after-
wards. . . . Whenever the condition is
broken the privilege is lost."11
The court agrees that attorneys, as citi-
zens, are entitled to withhold incriminating
answers.1 2 It does not accept, however, the
view that disbarment for having done so is
punishment for exerting the right, and thus
a violation of constitutional guarantees.
The court takes the position rather, that
disbarment is merely due acknowledgment
that an attorney has failed to maintain his
professional character and obligations.
How that failure or breach came about is
quite immaterial; paramount is the fact that
a breach of the duty of cooperation has oc-
curred.la Disbarment, therefore, is not the
consequence of asserting a constitutional
right, but on the contrary, it is a conse-
quence of refusing to observe the duty of
full disclosure.
10 Matter of Cohen, 7 N. Y. 2d 488, 166 N.E. 2d
672, 199 N.Y.S. 2d 658 (1960). "The key word is
duty .... Breach of the special duty brings a spe-
cial penalty." Id. at 496, 166 N.E. 2d at 676, 199
N.Y.S. 2d at 663.
11 Matter of Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E.
782, 783 (1917). See also Selling v. Radford, 243
U. S. 46 (1917).
12 Matter of Cohen, 7 N. Y. 2d 488, 495, 166
N.E. 2d 672, 675, 199 N.Y.S. 2d 658, 662 (1960).
13 Matter of Cohen, 7 N. Y. 2d 488,166 N.E. 2d
672, 199 N.Y.S. 2d 658 (1960). "Our present ap-
pellant by declining to answer may have escaped
criminal prosecution and punishment, but he
could never, while a member of the Bar, escape
the other consequences of his flagrant breach of
his absolute duty to the court whose officer he
was. That breach was in itself . . . a valid reason
for depriving appellant of his office as attorney."
Id. at 497, 166 N.E. 2d at 677, 199 N.Y.S. 2d at
664.
The distinction may appear to be a tenu-
ous one, but, as the majority opinion
indicates, it is not without full support in
precedent. Reference is made to a group
of decisions rendered by the New York
Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court. 14 These cases serve to
demonstrate that lawyers are not alone in
their obligation to answer, -ven though
that duty is wholly inconsistent with their
right against self incrimination. 15
The most recent of these cases (and
typical among them) is Nelson v. Los
Angeles County.16 There, the Supreme
Court sustained the dismissal of two
county employees who had refused to an-
swer questions posed by a congressional
sub-committee. By statute in California,
public employees are obliged to answer
any questions pertaining to membership in
subversive organizations. 17 Said the Court:
"the fact that he chose to place his refusal
[to answer questions] on a Fifth Amend-
ment claim puts the matter in no different
posture, for... California did not employ
that claim as the basis for drawing an in-
ference of guilt."' Is The dismissal of the em-
ployees for insubordination in the face of
statutory mandate to answer was thus not in
violation of any constitutional right be-
14 id. at 496, 166 N.E. 2d at 676-77, 199 N.Y.S.
2d at 663-64 (1960).
15 In similar positions, for example, are police
officers, Christal v. Police Comm'r, 33 Cal. App.
2d 564, 92 P. 2d 4,16 (1939), subway conductors,
Lerner v. Casey, 2 N. Y. 2d 355, 141 N.E. 2d
533, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (1957), afl'd, 357 U. S. 468
(1958), and public school teachers, Beilan v.
Board of Educ., 357 U. S. 399 (1958). Both
Lerner and Beilan were cited as controlling in
Nelson v. Los Angeles County, 362 U. S. 1
(1960).
16 362 U. S. 1 (1960).
17 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1028.1.
Is Nelson v. Los Angeles County, supra note 15,
at 7.
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cause the assertion of that right was not
the basis of the dismissal.
The Nelson case, therefore, finds
proper analogy to the constitutional issue
presented in Matter of Cohen. Both de-
fendants were disciplined, not for declin-
ing to answer, but because in so doing
they simultaneously violated a positive
duty to make full disclosure. Defendant
Nelson, as a public employee, was by
statute commanded to answer. Defendant
Cohen, as an attorney, was commanded
by the written ethics of his profession, 19
which are entitled to the force and effect
of legislative enactments. 20
Noteworthy is the fact that the decision
in Cohen relies heavily on federal deci-
sions interpreting the United States Con-
stitution. But whatever may 'be the case
under the federal constitution, past inter-
pretations placed on the Constitution of
New York State tend most strongly to
favor the position that a refusal to answer,
if it be placed on constitutional grounds,
is not cause for disbarment.
The question of an attorney's right to
assert his constitutional immunity from
self incrimination was first raised in New
York in Matter of Kaffenburgh.21 That de-
cision rejected the contention that disbar-
ment is the appropriate discipline for an
attorney who "refused to answer each and
all of the questions as to his personal
transactions, on the ground that his an-
swers might tend to incriminate him. .. ."
The rejection was based on the ground
that "the provision of our Code applies
to penalties or forfeitures as well as
19 Canon 22, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CAN-
ONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. See note 3 supra.
20 Matter of Annunziato, 201 Misc. 971, 973, 108
N.Y.S. 2d 101,103 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
21 188 N. Y. 49, 80 N.E. 570 (1907).
RECENT DECISIONS
crimes or misdemeanors. 22 The defendant,
therefore, . . . had the right to refrain
from answering any question which might
form the basis of or lead to the prosecution
of himself for a forfeiture of his office of
attorney .... ,23 The majority in Cohen dis-
tinguished Kaffenburgh on the ground that
it involved testimony at a criminal trial,
whereas in Cohen the proceedings were
purely investigative. However, since the
constitutional provisions protecting against
self incrimination are designed in large
measure to prevent subsequent prosecu-
tion of the witness on the basis of ,the testi-
mony given, the question must be asked
whether the distinction between an "in-
vestigation" and a criminal proceeding is
pertinent to the interpretation and appli-
cation of the right against self incrimina-
tion. Surely, a witness may be prosecuted
as effectively upon testimony given during
an "investigation" as upon that given in
a criminal trial. And, as Judge Fuld points
out in his dissent in Cohen: "The ques-
tions put to Kaffenburgh dealt solely with
his conduct in the practice of the law and,
certainly, he was as much an officer of
the court conducting the trial as the appel-
lant here was of the court conducting the
judicial inquiry." '24
Thirty years after Kaffenburgh came
22 N. Y. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §837. This
code is no longer in effect, having been super-
ceded by the Civil Practice Act. However, the
new act contains a provision similar to that con-
tained in the earlier code. "This provision [con-
cerning the right to avoid self incrimination] does
not require a witness to give an answer which will
tend to accuse himself of a crime or to expose
him to a penalty or forfeiture . N. Y. Civ.
PRAC. ACT §355.
23 Matter of Kaffenburgh, 188 N. Y. 49, 53, 80
N.E. 570, 570 (1907).
24 Matter of Cohen, 7 N. Y. 2d 488, 500, 166 N.E.
2d 672, 679, 199 N.Y.S. 2d 658, 667 (1960).
Matter of Solovei25 which dismissed dis-
barment proceedings brought against an
attorney who refused to waive his consti-
tutional immunity. There the court stated:
"Matter of Kaffenburgh decided that an
attorney who in good faith refused to an-
swer questions on the ground that they
would tend to incriminate him was not
amenable to disciplinary proceedings. '2 6
Matter of Solovei was distinguished by the
majority in Cohen on the ground that it
involved testimony given before a Grand
Jury and not before a court inquiry as in
the present case. Again, the question
arises whether that distinction merits the
controlling force given it, and again, it
must be doubted that it does. If a case is
to be effectively distinguished, ought not
the varying circumstances call to action
a superseding principle? All things may be
distinguished, but only those distinctions
affecting principle can further the argu-
ment offered.
The appellant in the present case relied
most heavily on Matter of Grae27 and Mat-
ter of Ellis.28 Both these decisions con-
strued Article I, section 6 of the New York
Constitution as applied to attorneys. In
each case, the attorney was spared disbar-
ment.
In Matter of Grae, the defendant, al-
though expressing his willingness to an-
swer questions before a judicial inquiry
investigating so called "ambulance chas-
ing" practices on Staten Island, refused
to sign a waiver of immunity and thereby
25 276 N. Y. 647, 12 N.E. 2d 802 (1938), affirm-
ing mem. 250 App. Div. 117, 293 N.Y.S. 640
(2d Dep't 1937) (per curiam).
26 Matter of Solovei, 250 App. Div. 117, 121,
293 N.Y.S. 640, 645 (2d Dep't 1937) (per
curiam), aff'd mem., 276 N. Y. 647, 12 N.E. 2d
802 (1938).
27 282 N. Y. 428, 26 N.E. 2d 963 (1940).
28 282 N. Y. 435, 26 N.E. 2d 967 (1940).
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relinquish his privilege against self incrim-
ination. The Court of Appeals held that
the defendant was within his legal right in
declining to surrender a protection guar-
anteed to him by the constitution. 29 The
present case compared to Matter of Grae
produces this anomaly: every citizen, in-
cluding aji attorney, is entitled to the privi-
lege against self incrimination, and no dis-
ciplinary action may be taken against an
attorney who refuses to relinquish the pro-
tection it affords; nevertheless, an attorney,
having retained the privilege, may not em-
ploy it. To do so is to violate a positive
duty of full disclosure to the court.
Matter of Ellis presented circumstances
very similar to those appearing in Matter
of Grae. However, in addition to declining
to execute a waiver of immunity, the de-
fendant Ellis also refused to answer any
questions on the ground that such' answers
would tend to incriminate him. Ellis later
expressed his willingness to testify, but the
court was of the opinion that his testimony
ought not to be taken until he consented to
waive his immunity. Disbarment proceed-
ings were instituted upon these facts. The
Court of Appeals cited Matter of Grae as
controlling and dismissed the charge; this,
notwithstanding Ellis' refusal to answer
questions.
Both Ellis and Grae held the duty to dis-
close to be subservient to the right against
self incrimination. "The constitutional privi-
lege is a fundamental right and a measure
of duty; its exercise cannot be a breach of
duty to the court."3 0 The majority in the
instant case laid Ellis and Grae aside, stat-
ing: "The holding in each case was that a
lawyer like every other citizen is constitu-
29 Matter of Grae, 282 N. Y. 428, 434, 26 N.E.
2d 963, 967 (1940).
30 Id. at 435, 26 N.E. 2d at 967.
6 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1960
tionally privileged not to answer damaging
questions. The difference between those
cases and the present one may seem slight
but it is enough to permit a fresh examina-
tion (or re-examination) of the question
now directly presented. '31 It must be agreed
that the "difference" is indeed slight, par-
ticularly with regard to Matter of Ellis
where the defendant's refusal to answer
questions went wholly unpunished and, in
fact, unquestioned.
Despite its lack of support in New York
precedent, and although that precedent ac-
tually militates strongly to the contrary,
the decision in Matter of Cohen appears to
be both prudent and timely. As indicated
previously, the concept of a positive duty of
disclosure accruing as a condition of mem-
bership in the bar is not a new one. That
the duties of office may be divorced from,
and operate without the application of, op-
posing constitutional protections is not
without justification in logic and precedent.
(However, such precedent in New York
does not deal specifically with attorneys.) 32
A most significant result of the decision
in Matter of Cohen, no doubt, will be sub-
stantially increased effectiveness in combat-
ting the evils wrought by the demoralizing
practice of "ambulance chasing. '33 The
31 Matter of Cohen, 7 N. Y. 2d 488, 497, 166 N.E.
2d 672, 677, 199 N.Y.S. 2d 658, 664 (1960).
32 This is true although the majority in the instant
case placed considerable reliance on a New York
decision, People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248
N. Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928), which held that
an attorney's refusal to answer questions and his
fefusal even to be sworn in, constituted grounds
for disbarment. However, defendant Culkin as-
serted no constitutional ground for his refusals,
and therefore no constitutional question arose.
Since the major issue in Matter of Cohen was one
of constitutional interpretation, the Karlin case
has no real place in its determination.
33 For comprehensive discussions on the practice
of "ambulance chasing," its elements and effects,
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problem of intensive preparation and in-
vestigation, and the task of convincing lay
juries that solicitation of business is con-
demnable in the practice of law, will no
longer be troublesome obstacles in the
prosecution of errant attorneys. Condemn-
ing evidence may now be gleaned from
direct examination of the attorney charged;
or, in the event such attorney refuses to
testify, discipline may be exercised via dis-
barment proceedings grounded upon the
violation of a duty to make full disclosure.
see Matter of.Bar Ass'n of City of New York, 222
App. Div. 580, 227 N.Y.S. 1 (1st Dep't 1928), and
Legal Ethics - Ambulance Chasing, 30 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 182 (1955).
Two oft quoted declarations serve as
succinct statements of the philosophy of the
present law in New York on the issue here
discussed: "Co-operation between court
and officer in furtherance of justice is a
phrase without reality if the officer may then
be silent in the face of a command to
speak. ' '34 "The petitioner may have a con-
stitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman" 35
(nor, by analogy, an attorney).
34 People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465,
471, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928) (Cardozo, C. J.).
35 McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass.
216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (Holmes, J.).
